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In these days when paternalism and socialism in legislation
find so many advocates and supporters, the case of Low v. Rees
Printing Company, 59 N. W. Rep. 362, decided by the Supreme
Court of Nebraska, on June 6th, is instructive. The case involved
the constitutionality of Sections x and 3 of Chapter 54 of the
Session Laws of i8gi. These sections provided, in effect, that
for all classes of mechanics, servants and laborers, excepting those
engaged in farm and domestic labor, a day's work should not
exceed eight hours, and that for working any employ6 over the
prescribed time the employer should pay extra compensation, in
increasing geometrical progression, for the excess over eight
hours. In a careful opinion, in which the authorities were
exhaustively reviewed, the Court decided that the act in question
was unconstitutional; because, first, in discriminating against farm
and domestic laborers the legislation was special, and was thereby
in conflict with Section i5, Article 3, of the Constitution, which
provides that '"in all cases where a general law can be made
applicable, no special law shall be enacted," and, second, the con-
stitutional right of parties to contract with reference to coihpensa-
tion for services is denied. The Court disposed of the argument
that the act was a police regulation, by observing that "under
pretense of the exercise of that power the legislature cannot pro-
hibit harmless acts, which do not. concern the health, safety, and
welfare of society."
What is a newspaper" within the meaning of a statute pro-
viding for the publication in a newspaper of certain notices of
probate proceedings? This question recently came up for decision
before the Supreme Court of Michigan, in the case Lynch v. .Durfee,
Probate Judge (59 N. W. Rep. 409). The appellee, the probate
judge, had ordered that a certain notice of hearing be published
in the Wayne County Legal News. The appellant Jhad sought to
obtain a writ of prohibition against the Probate Court in the Cir-
cuit Court of Wayne County, on the ground that the before men-
tioned journal was not a newspaper within the meaning of the
statute. The writ of prohibition was denied, and the case
came to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The journal to which
objection was taken was a weekly publication, devoted, primarily,
to the interests of the legal profession but containing matters of
interest to the general public. The Court, in deciding that the
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journal in question was a newspaper within the meaning of the
statute, say, "But a newspaper, even in the days when these
statutes were enacted, meant what it means to-day-a sheet of
paper printed and distributed at short intervals for conveying
intelligence of passing events; a public print that circulates news,
advertisements, proceedings of legislative bodies, public docu-
ments and the like."
By Act of Congress, November 3d, 1893, a Chinaman claiming
to be a merchant, and making application for entrance into the
United States on the ground that he was formerly engaged in this
country as a merchant, is required to establish by the testimony of
two creditable witnesses, other than Chinese, that he was engaged
in this country in buying and selling merchandise at a fixed place
of business conducted in his own name for at least one year before
his departure from the United States, and that during that year
he was not engaged in manual labor, except such as was necessary
for his business as merchant. A case turning on the application
of this act is reported in 6i Fed. Rep. 395, In re Quan Gui. The
petitioner, a Chinaman, claimed that he was entitled to enter the
United States, as he was a merchant, member of the firm of Yow,
Kee & Co. Several witnesses, not Chinese, were called for the
petitioner, who testified to his connection with the firm of Yow
Kee, and this testimony was supported, in the argument, by a
statement that Chinese merchants select words of supposed lucky
import for company or firm names. The Court, however, pointed
out that in the petition the firm name is given as Yow, Kee & Co.,
and observed that this fact would indicate that the name was not
a word but the business title of two or more individuals associated
together. And it was held that "as there was no proof that the
petitioner conducted any business in his own name, and no explan-
ation was given of the fact that his name did not appear in the firm
name, as is usual in partnerships in this country, he must be
refused a landing in accordance with the express direction of the
statute."
A case which, in the words of the Court, '- raises a new and
important question under the copyright act of March 3d, 189i,
(26 Stat. iio6)," was decided in the Circuit Court D. Massachu-
setts in August last (Lialeton et al. v. Oliver Ditson Co., 62 Fed.
Rep. 597). The question was whether a musical composition is
a book or lithograph within the meaning of the proviso in Section
3 of the act, which declares that in the case of a "book, photo-
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graph, chromo or lithograph," the two copies required to be
deposited with the Librarian of Congress shall be manufactured in
this country. This act, which extends to foreigners the privilege
of copyright, recites in Section 3 the conditions to be complied
with. These conditions are, in part, as follows: The applicant
for copyright "shall deliver at the office of the librarian two
copies of such copyright book, map, chart, dramatic or musical
composition, engraving, chromo, cut, print, or photograph, or in
case of a painting, drawing, statue, statuary, model or design for
a work of the fine arts, a photograph of the same, provided that
in the case of a book, photograph, chromo or lithograph, the two
copies of the same required to be delivered or deposited as above
shall be printed from type set within the limits of the United
States, or from plates made therefrom, or from negatives, or
drawings on stone made within the limits of the United States, or
from transfers made therefrom." It seems clear from the mention
both of "book" and "musical composition" in the section which
enumerates the things which may be copyrighted, that the former
word was not intended to include the musical composition. Then,
in the proviso which enumerates the copyrighted things that must
be manufactured in this country, "book, photograph, chromo" and
"lithograph" only are mentioned; "musical composition," as well
as "map, chart," "engraving," being omitted. From this examin-
ation of the words of the act the Court comes to the conclusion that
"musical compositions" were intentionally excepted from the
operation of the proviso. This decision, which seems clearly
right, enables foreign publishers of music to copyright in this
country without manufacturing their productions within the limits
of the United States.
An interesting case, involving the liability of municipal cor-
porations for damages from death by the act of a mob, was
decided a short while back by the Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth
Circuit (City of New Orleans v. 4bbagnato). The facts were these:
Abbagnato, an Italian, with some twenty other persons, was
arrested and tried on a charge of murder of the chief of police of
the City of New Orleans, and was acquitted. Pending further
legal proceedings, however, he was detained in custody in the
parish prison. From this prison he and some others were taken by
an organized and riotous mob, and was riddled with bullets after
having been hanged on a lamp-post on the street. Thereupon
his mother sued the. City for damages for her son's death, alleging
culpable negligence on the part of the police. The case was tried
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in the Circuit Court of the United States, and a verdict rendered
against the City for $5,ooo. The City brought the case for
review, assigning as error that municipal corporations of
Louisiana are not liable for damage by mobs, except for damage
to property. The Circuit Court of Appeals, in reversing the
decision of the court below, brings out clearly the principle
governing the liability of municipal corporations in such cases.
This liability, when it exists, is entirely a matter of statute. "In
the case of State v. Mayor, etc., of New Orleans, 109 U. S. 285, the
Supreme Court of the United States held that the right to demand
reimbursement from a municipal corporation for damages caused
by a mob is not founded on contract. It is a statutory right and
may be given or taken away at pleasure." The reason of this rule
is obvious. "Such actions are actions to hold such corporations
liable in damages for a failure to preserve the public peace. The
preservation of the public peace primarily devolves upon the
sovereign." It follows, of course, that when this duty is devolved
by the State on to a municipal corporation, the corporation in the
discharge of it, is charged with governmental functions, and "is
entitled to the same immunity as the sovereign granting the power
for negligence in preserving the public peace, unless such liability
is expressly declared by the sovereign." Mr. Justice Bradley in
case of State v. Mayor, etc., of New Orleans, supra, said, "that rem-
edies against municipal bodies for damages caused by mobs or other
violators of law, unconnected with the municipal government, are
purely matters of legislative policy, depending on positive law,which
may at any time be repealed or modified, either before or after
the damage has occurred, and the repeal of which causes the
remedy to cease." It is clearly laid down, and the principle may
be taken to be that there is no liability attaching to a municipal
corporation for damages resulting from a negligent discharge of
itspublic duties, that is, the sovereign duties granted to it by the
State, unless such liability is expressly fixed upon it by statute.
When such liability is fixed upon them it is thus laid down by
Dillen (Mun. Corp. Sec. 980), wherein the author says, "The
doctrine may be considered as established where a given duty is a
corporate one, that is, one which rests upon the municipality in
respect of its special or local interests and not as a public agency,
and is absolute and perfect and not discretionary and judicial in its
nature, and is one owing to the plainfif or in the performance of
which he is specially interested, that the corporation is liable in a
civil action for the damages resulting to individuals by the neglect
to perform the duty," etc.
